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Functional movement disorders (FMD) are characterized by motor symptoms (e.g.,
tremor, gait disorder, and dystonia) that are not compatible with movement abnormalities
related to a known organic cause. One key clinical feature of FMD is that motor
symptoms are similar to voluntary movements but are subjectively experienced as
involuntary by patients. This gap might be related to abnormal self-recognition of
bodily action, which involves two main components: sense of agency and sense of
body ownership. The aim of this study was to systematically investigate whether this
function is altered in FMD, specifically focusing on the subjective feeling of agency,
body ownership, and their interaction during normal voluntary movements. Patients
with FMD (n = 21) and healthy controls (n = 21) underwent the moving Rubber Hand
Illusion (mRHI), in which passive and active movements can differentially elicit agency,
ownership or both. Explicit measures of agency and ownership were obtained via a
questionnaire. Patients and controls showed a similar pattern of response: when the
rubber hand was in a plausible posture, active movements elicited strong agency and
ownership; implausible posture of the rubber hand abolished ownership but not agency;
passive movements suppressed agency but not ownership. These findings suggest that
explicit sense of agency and body ownership are preserved in FMD. The latter finding is
shared by a previous study in FMD using a static version of the RHI, whereas the former
appears to contrast with studies demonstrating altered implicit measures of agency
(e.g., sensory attenuation). Our study extends previous findings by suggesting that in
FMD: (i) the sense of body ownership is retained also when interacting with the motor
system; (ii) the subjective experience of agency for voluntary tapping movements, as
measured by means of mRHI, is preserved.
Keywords: self-recognition, bodily actions, sense of agency, sense of body ownership, functional movement
disorders, rubber hand illusion
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INTRODUCTION
The experience of the body as one’s own (i.e., sense of
body ownership) and the sense of authorship over movements
(i.e., sense of agency) are basic cognitive components of self-
recognition of bodily actions (van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002;
Jeannerod, 2003; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Louzolo et al., 2015). This
cognitive function is taken for granted in everyday life, although
it appears to be altered in some pathological conditions, like
functional movement disorders (FMD).
Functional movement disorders are characterized by the
presence of motor symptoms in the absence of neurological
disease (Edwards et al., 2013). The most common form is
tremor, followed by dystonia and myoclonus (Factor et al.,
1995; Bhatia and Shneider, 2007; Edwards and Bhatia, 2012).
Pure functional gait disorder accounts for about 6% of patients,
although abnormal gait is commonly present in association
with other forms of FMD (Baik and Lang, 2007; Edwards
and Bhatia, 2012). Regardless of the phenomenology, there are
common clinical features characterizing FMD, such as sudden
onset of symptoms, rapid progression, variability in symptom
severity, and past history of other functional motor symptoms
(Edwards and Bhatia, 2012). However, one key feature of
FMD that distinguishes it from organic movement disorders is
that the motor symptoms resemble voluntary movements (e.g.,
functional tremor disappears with distraction) but are perceived
as involuntary by the patient (Hallett, 2010, 2016; Edwards
et al., 2011). In other words, although the motor symptoms look
like intentionally produced movements, the patients’ self-report
is that the abnormal movements are not under their control
(Edwards et al., 2013).
Because of their similarity with voluntary movements,
functional motor symptoms are often interpreted as being
feigned by patients (Macerollo et al., 2015). Recent evidence
against this interpretation suggests, however, that the dissociation
between the voluntary nature of motor symptoms and the sense
of involuntariness reported by patients could hint at a lack
of sense of agency (Voon et al., 2010, 2011; Edwards et al.,
2011; Kranick et al., 2013; Pareés et al., 2014; Macerollo et al.,
2015).
The sense of agency is the feeling of control over one’s
own action. This basic cognitive function allows to distinguish
between self-generated and externally generated movements
(David et al., 2016). According to computational models of
motor control such as the comparator model (Frith et al., 2000;
Blakemore et al., 2002; Chambon et al., 2014), a sense of agency
arises from the matching between the predicted and the actual
sensory outcome of intended actions. In this view, a voluntary
action starts with the intention to achieve a desired state, with a
motor command generated to reach the goal as a consequence.
Additionally, a predictive component within the motor system
uses a copy of the motor command (so-called efference copy)
to predict the sensory outcome of the intended movement. This
prediction is then compared to the actual sensory outcome,
and in case they match, the sense of agency arises (Frith et al.,
2000; Blakemore et al., 2002; Chambon et al., 2014; Haggard,
2017). A sensory consequence of the comparison between the
predicted and the actual sensory outcome is the so-called sensory
attenuation.
Sensory attenuation refers to perceiving a sensory event as less
intense when it occurs in association with a voluntary, but not
with an involuntary, movement (Blakemore et al., 1998, 2000).
A loss of sensory attenuation during self-generated movements
(e.g., abduction of the thumb) has been found in different types
of FMD as compared to healthy volunteers (Pareés et al., 2014;
Macerollo et al., 2015). This finding was interpreted as behavioral
evidence for a reduced sense of agency in FMD.
In the same line, another study applied a different behavioral
paradigm, such as intentional binding, as an implicit measure of
agency in FMD (Kranick et al., 2013). Intentional binding refers
to the subjective temporal attraction between a voluntary action
and its sensory outcome (Haggard et al., 2002). When an action
(e.g., pressing a button) is executed voluntarily, participants
perceive the action and its sensory outcome as temporally closer
together than they actually are. This effect does not occur
for involuntary movements, however (Haggard et al., 2002).
Intentional binding is decreased in FMD patients as compared to
healthy controls, further supporting the hypothesis of an altered
sense of agency in FMD (Kranick et al., 2013).
All these studies have been important in demonstrating that
the sense of agency in FMD is altered according to implicit
measures. Of note, however, the tasks described above required
participants to judge the time of performed movement or its
perceptual consequences, rather than the feeling of control over
bodily movement. Hence, no study to date has linked the sense of
agency to the perception of bodily movements in FMD.
Here, we investigated whether patients with FMD can
recognize an observed bodily movement as self-produced or
externally generated. To this aim, we applied the moving rubber
hand illusion (mRHI) paradigm, in which participants experience
a sense of agency by observing a rubber hand actively moved by
their own hidden hand (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). In addition,
the mRHI allows to investigate the sense of body ownership, the
other main component of self-recognition of bodily actions (van
den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002; Jeannerod, 2003; Tsakiris et al.,
2007; Louzolo et al., 2015).
While the sense of agency is the feeling of control over
bodily moments, the sense of body ownership is the feeling
that the moving body part belongs to the self. The sense of
body ownership arises from the multisensory integration of
different sensory signals (e.g., visual, tactile, and proprioceptive)
coming from the body. More precisely, when the brain receives
temporally and spatially congruent sensory input from a body
part, that body part is experienced as belonging to oneself
(Tsakiris et al., 2007). During voluntary movements, the sense
of agency and the sense of body ownership coincide. In case of
involuntary movements, instead, it is possible to distinguish one
from the other. That is, a moving body part is still perceived as
belonging to the self even though an external agent causes the
movement. This suggests that the sense of body ownership can
be consistent with a lack of sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000).
The sense of body ownership and the sense of agency, although
independent, may strongly influence each other (Newport et al.,
2010; Tsakiris et al., 2010).
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In the mRHI paradigm, by manipulating the agent of the
movement (self or other) and the posture of the rubber hand
(plausible or implausible), we can investigate the sense of agency
and the sense of body ownership separately or in interaction.
For instance, when the movement is passively induced by the
experimenter, the sense of body ownership over the visible
hand is retained, whereas the sense of agency is abolished.
Conversely, active movements of a rotated rubber hand induce
an opposite pattern, with the sense of agency retained and
the sense of body ownership abolished (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012).
That movements interact with the sense of the body can
be inferred from previous studies that applied the classical
RHI paradigm in pathological populations (Fiorio et al., 2011;
Lenggenhager et al., 2012; Scandola et al., 2014; Tidoni et al.,
2014; Burin et al., 2015). More precisely, patients with impaired
movement execution due to various different causes, including
dystonia (Fiorio et al., 2011), spinal cord injury (Lenggenhager
et al., 2012; Scandola et al., 2014; Tidoni et al., 2014) or
stroke (Burin et al., 2015), present with a weaker sense of
body ownership. Furthermore, a recent TMS study in healthy
participants showed that excitability of the primary motor cortex
interacts with body ownership (Della Gatta et al., 2016). The
mRHI paradigm allows to directly investigate the link between
movements and the sense of the body. Hence, by applying
the mRHI paradigm in FMD patients and healthy controls, we
expected to find a specific pattern of results in the different
experimental conditions. In the condition that selectively induces
a sense of body ownership (but not agency), we predicted similar
performance in patients and controls, as demonstrated in a recent
study with a static version of the RHI paradigm (Demartini
et al., 2016). Instead, in the condition that selectively induces a
sense of agency (but not body ownership), we would expect an
alteration in FMD, which resembles a lack of control over motor
symptoms. Finally, according to previous findings demonstrating
that a lack of agency may prevent ownership (Newport et al.,
2010), we would expect a reduced sense of ownership related to
the altered sense of agency in the condition eliciting both agency
and ownership.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-one patients [19 women; mean age± standard deviation
(SD), 39.48 ± 12.84 years] with clinically defined diagnosis of
FMD were recruited from the Neurology Section, University
Hospital of Verona, and the Neurology Division, Voghera
Civil Hospital (see Table 1 for clinical and demographic
characteristics). Diagnostic criteria for FMD patients referred to
the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fifth edition (DSM-5) (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013).
Exclusion criteria were sensory abnormalities and other
major neurological disorders. Twenty-one healthy volunteers
(17 women; mean age ± SD, 45.24 ± 11.86 years) were recruited
for the control group at the Department of Neurosciences,
Biomedicine and Movement Sciences, University of Verona. All
participants were right-handed. The study was approved
by the ethical committee of the University Hospital of
TABLE 1 | Demographic and clinical data for patients.
Patient/gender Age Disease duration (months) Type and localization of functional symptoms Medication
1/F 36 1 Gait disorder Amitriptyline
2/F 44 84 Gait disorder Clonazepam
3/F 66 84 Gait disorder None
4/F 44 10 Gait disorder Escitalopram Alprazolam
5/F 37 8 Gait disorder,Dystonia (neck) Delorazepam
6/F 40 18 Gait disorder,Dystonia (both legs) Amitriptyline
7/F 44 24 Gait disorder None
8/F 34 n.a. Gait disorder None
9/F 36 6 Gait disorder,Tremor (both hands) Citalopram
10/F 26 40 Gait disorder Venlafaxine
11/F 32 32 Gait disorder None
12/M 52 3 Gait disorder,Tremor (both hands) Duloxetine Diazepam
13/F 38 36 Gait disorder Bromazepam
14/F 29 36 Gait disorder,Tremor (hands and legs) Duloxetine Lorazepam
15/F 53 48 Gait disorder,Tremor (right hand) Escitalopram
16/F 23 3 Gait disorder,Dystonia (neck),Tremor (both hands) Amitriptyline Diazepam
17/F 30 6 Tremor (both hands) Amitriptyline Delorazepam
18/M 30 2 Tremor (right hand) None
19/F 22 10 Gait disorder,Dystonia (neck),Tremor (both hands) None
20/F 70 12 Tremor (both hands) Alprazolam
21/F 51 36 Tremor (left hand) None
n.a., not available.
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Verona. Participants gave their written informed consent
prior to participation. The experiment was carried out
in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of
Helsinki.
mRHI Set-Up
Participants sat at a table with their right hand hidden from view
inside a box (35 cm × 25 cm × 12 cm). A realistic artificial
right hand fashioned from a yellow, cotton-filled rubber glove
(distance from the wrist to the index fingertip, 25 cm) was
positioned on top of the box (Figure 1A). Before starting the
experiment, participants donned a yellow glove to make the real
hand appear as similar as possible to the rubber hand. The index
fingertips of the participant’s hand and the rubber hand were
inserted into plastic rings that were connected to a wooden stick
(Figure 1A). A black drape connected to the box covered the
participant’s right arm and shoulder.
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in a single session lasting
about 1 h (comprising all the phases of the procedure, from
consent form collection to the end of the real experiment).
The task entailed watching the rubber hand while performing
tapping movements with the right index finger. The finger
movements were performed following a semi-regular rhythm,
in which double taps were executed at random intervals. More
precisely, the participants had to perform tapping movements
with the right index finger on a table, following a rhythm
of about 1 Hz (as described in Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012).
In order to avoid a regular rhythm of the movement, which
FIGURE 1 | Moving Rubber Hand Illusion apparatus. (A) In the Active Synchronous Congruent condition, when the participant actively moved her own index finger,
the rubber hand moved in turn. This condition usually evokes the sense of agency and the sense of ownership over the rubber hand. The red arrow indicates the
direction of the movement. (B) In the Passive Synchronous Congruent condition, the experimenter moved a wooden stick, thus causing both the participant’s hand
and the rubber hand to move. This condition usually induces ownership but not agency over the rubber hand. (C) In the Active Synchronous Incongruent condition,
the rubber hand was rotated of 180 degrees with respect to the participant’s hand. The participant moved her index finger and the rubber hand moved
synchronously. This condition usually evokes agency but not ownership over the rubber hand. (D) In the Active Asynchronous Congruent condition, the rubber hand
was placed in an anatomically congruent position and the participant performed active movements as in the Active Synchronous Congruent condition. In this case,
however, the rubber hand was moved by the experimenter with a short delay with respect to the onset of the participant’s movement. This condition does not evoke
sense of agency or sense of body ownership.
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could have prevented the illusion (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012), we told the participants they could vary the duration
of the breaks between two consecutive taps at their own
discretion. Prior to the experiment, the participants were
taught the semi-regular tapping rhythm with the aid of a
metronome set at 1 Hz (not present during the experiment).
In order to be sure that the participants had correctly
learned and retained the acquired semi-regular rhythm, the
last part of the training was performed without the help of
the metronome (as in the real experiment). The experimenter
showed the participants how to perform the movements and
corrected any mistakes in executing the movements (e.g.,
regular instead of irregular pattern, single instead of double
tapping, etc.).
We applied four experimental conditions which differed
for three parameters: type of movement (active vs. passive),
relative position of the rubber hand and the participant’s hand
(congruent vs. incongruent), synchrony between the movement
of the participant’s hand and the rubber hand (synchronous vs.
asynchronous). A detailed description of the four experimental
conditions is given below.
Active Synchronous Congruent Condition (Figure 1A)
The participant’s index finger was connected with a wooden stick
to the index finger of the rubber hand. When the participant
actively moved her hidden index finger, the index finger of the
visible rubber hand moved in synchrony. This condition usually
evokes a strong illusion of ownership over the rubber hand, as
well as a strong sense of agency on the observed movement
(Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012).
Passive Synchronous Congruent Condition
(Figure 1B)
The index fingers of the participant’s hand and the rubber
hand were connected with a wooden stick. The participant was
instructed to relax her hand while the experimenter moved the
two index fingers using the wooden stick. This condition usually
evokes a strong illusion of ownership over the rubber hand but
not a feeling of agency, since the participant does not actively
control the movement of the rubber hand (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012).
Active Synchronous Incongruent Condition
(Figure 1C)
The rubber hand was rotated 180 degrees with respect to
the position of the participant’s hand. The two hands were
connected with a wooden stick and the participant was asked
to actively move her hidden index finger and to watch the
visible rubber finger moving in synchrony. In this condition, the
participant usually feels agency but not ownership because of the
incongruent posture of the rubber hand.
Active Asynchronous Congruent Condition
(Figure 1D)
The participant’s hand and the rubber hand were disconnected
from one another. Concealed behind a panel, the experimenter
moved the finger of the rubber hand immediately (∼500 ms)
after the participant moved her finger. Although in this condition
the rubber hand is in a plausible posture, the asynchrony
between the two movements disrupts both ownership and
agency.
Each trial lasted 90 s and was performed only once, resulting
in a total of four experimental trials.
mRHI Questionnaire
To measure the sense of ownership and sense of agency, we
used the Italian version of the 16-statement questionnaire devised
by Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012) (Table 2). The questionnaire
statements can be grouped into four categories: four statements
concern the illusory sense of ownership (e.g., “I felt as if the rubber
hand was my hand”) (ownership-statements), four statements are
related to sense of agency (e.g., “I felt as if I caused the movement
I saw”) (agency-statements), and eight statements serve as
controls, four for the sense of ownership (ownership-control)
and four for the sense of agency (agency-control) (Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014; Jenkinson and Preston, 2015). The
control statements are not related to the subjective experience
of ownership and agency, but serve to rule out confounding
factors like compliance, suggestibility, and expectancy effects
(e.g., ownership-control: “It seems as if I had more than one right
hand”, agency-control: “I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling
my will”) (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014; Jenkinson and
Preston, 2015).
At the end of each trial, the 16 statements were presented
in random order and the participant was asked to rate
her agreement on a 7-point Likert scale from −3 (“totally
disagree”) to +3 (“totally agree”), with 0 (“uncertain”) indicating
neither agreement nor disagreement (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012).
Data Analyses
Demographic data were analyzed by means of a t-test (age) and
a chi-squared test (gender) to verify whether the two groups
were comparable for age and gender distribution. The ratings
given to four statements in each category were averaged together
to obtain a mean score for ownership-statements, agency-
statements, ownership-controls, and agency-controls. Data were
first assessed for normal distribution with the Shapiro–Wilk test.
Since the data were not normally distributed (p < 0.05), non-
parametric tests were applied. The statistical design was planned
stepwise as follows:
First, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to compare
the mean value of the ownership-statements and agency-
statements with the mean value of the respective ownership-
control and agency-control, in each experimental condition
and in each group separately. These comparisons allowed to
check the reliability of the mRHI paradigm in inducing a
sense of body ownership and a sense of agency. In order to
test whether the scores at the experimental statements (for
both ownership and agency) were significantly different from
zero (that indicates “uncertainty”) in specific conditions, the
ownership- and the agency-statements were compared against
zero by means of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in each
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TABLE 2 | The moving Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire.
English version
(by Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012)
Italian version
Ownership-statements
(1) I felt as if I was looking at my own hand. (1) Mi sentivo come se stessi guardando la mia mano.
(2) I felt as if the rubber hand was part of my body. (2) Mi sentivo come se la mano di gomma fosse parte del mio corpo.
(3) It seemed as if I were sensing the movement of my finger in the location
where the rubber finger moved.
(3) Sembrava come se sentissi il movimento del mio dito nello stesso punto in
cui si muoveva il dito della mano di gomma.
(4) I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand. (4) Mi sentivo come se la mano di gomma fosse la mia mano.
Ownership-control
(5) I felt as if my real hand were turning rubbery. (5) Mi sentivo come se la mia mano stesse diventando di gomma.
(6) It seems as if I had more than one right hand. (6) Sembrava come se io avessi più di una mano destra/sinistra.
(7) It appeared as if the rubber hand were drifting toward my real hand. (7) Sembrava come se la mano di gomma si spostasse verso la mia mano.
(8) It felt as if I had no longer a right hand, as if my right hand had disappeared. (8) Mi sentivo come se non avessi più la mano destra, come se la mia mano
destra fosse scomparsa.
Agency-statements
(9) The rubber hand moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was obeying my will. (9) La mano di gomma si muoveva proprio come volevo, come se stesse
obbedendo alla mia volontà.
(10) I felt as if I was controlling the movements of the rubber hand. (10) Mi sentivo come se stessi controllando i movimenti della mano di gomma.
(11) I felt as if I was causing the movement I saw. (11) Mi sentivo come se io stessi causando i movimenti che vedevo.
(12) Whenever I moved my finger I expected the rubber finger to move in the
same way.
(12) Ogni volta che muovevo il mio dito mi aspettavo che il dito di gomma si
muovesse nello stesso modo.
Agency-control
(13) I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling my will. (13) Mi sentivo come se la mano di gomma stesse controllando la mia volontà.
(14) I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling my movements. (14) Mi sentivo come se la mano di gomma stesse controllando i miei
movimenti.
(15) I could sense the movement from somewhere between my real hand and
the rubber hand.
(15) Mi è sembrato di percepire il movimento da qualche parte tra la mia mano
e la mano di gomma.
(16) It seemed as if the rubber hand had a will of its own. (16) Sembrava come se la mano di gomma avesse una volontà propria.
group. Moreover, to investigate the relation between ownership
and agency within the conditions, agency-statements were
compared with the ownership-statements in each condition and
in each group separately by means of the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test.
Second, the Friedman test was used to analyze the factor
condition (Active Synchronous Congruent, Passive Synchronous
Congruent, Active Synchronous Incongruent, and Active
Asynchronous Congruent) separately for the ownership-
statements and the agency-statements in each group. Post hoc
comparisons were performed using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test. This analysis allowed to test whether the sense of body
ownership and the sense of agency varied across experimental
conditions.
Third, the Mann–Whitney U test was used to compare the
ownership-statements, ownership-controls, agency-statements
and agency-controls between the two groups (FMD patients and
healthy controls) across the four conditions.
Finally, the Spearman correlation was performed in order
to investigate whether ownership-statements and agency-
statements scores were related to disease duration in FMD
patients.
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was applied
where necessary. All tests were two-tailed. P-values ≤ 0.05
were considered statistically significant. Additional analyses are
reported in the Supplementary Materials.
RESULTS
Preliminary analyses showed that the two groups were
comparable for age [t(40) = 1.511; p = 0.139] and gender
(χ2 = 0.778; p= 0.378) distribution.
Reliability of the mRHI Paradigm
FMD Group
In the FMD group, ownership-statements were rated significantly
higher than ownership-control in the Active Synchronous
Congruent condition (ownership-statements, 1.52 ± 0.39;
ownership-control, −1.68 ± 0.28; p < 0.001) and in the
Passive Synchronous Congruent condition (ownership-
statements, 1.56 ± 0.37; ownership-control, −1.39 ± 0.31;
p = 0.001). Interestingly, ownership-statements were rated
significantly higher than ownership-controls also in the Active
Synchronous Incongruent condition (ownership-statements,
−0.58 ± 0.42; ownership-control, −1.81 ± 0.29; p < 0.017),
which usually evokes agency but not ownership. In this
case, however, the mean score of ownership-statements was
negative, indicating a general disagreement with the statements
assessing ownership (Figure 2A). Agency-statements were
rated significantly higher than agency-control in the Active
Synchronous Congruent (agency-statements, 2.42 ± 0.24;
agency-control, −1.05 ± 0.43; p < 0.001) and in the Active
Synchronous Incongruent conditions (agency-statements,
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FIGURE 2 | Questionnaire ratings in the two groups. Mean scores for the ownership-statements (light gray columns), ownership-controls (light gray striped
columns), agency-statements (dark gray columns), and agency-controls (dark gray striped columns) in the functional movement disorders group (A) and the healthy
controls group (B). Gray lines and asterisks show significant comparisons within conditions. Note that in both groups the Passive Synchronous Congruent condition
elicited ownership but not agency, and that conversely the Active Synchronous Incongruent condition elicited agency but not ownership, suggesting a double
dissociation between agency and ownership. Error bars indicate standard errors.
2.28 ± 0.19; agency-control, −1.71 ± 0.22; p < 0.001)
(Figure 2A).
Healthy Control Group
Similar results were found in the control group, with ownership-
statements having higher scores than ownership-control in
the Active Synchronous Congruent condition (ownership-
statements, 1.40 ± 0.28; ownership-control, −0.81 ± 0.28;
p < 0.001), in the Passive Synchronous Congruent condition
(ownership-statements, 1.21 ± 0.43; ownership-control,
−1.15 ± 0.38; p < 0.001) and in the Active Synchronous
Incongruent condition (ownership-statements, −1.27 ± 0.38;
ownership-control, −2.13 ± 0.29; p = 0.002) (Figure 2B).
Similarly, agency-statements were rated significantly higher than
agency-control in the Active Synchronous Congruent (agency-
statements, 2.42± 0.22; agency-control,−1.63± 0.30; p< 0.001)
and in the Active Synchronous Incongruent conditions (agency-
statements, 2.11± 0.30; agency-control,−1.94± 0.29; p< 0.001)
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TABLE 3 | Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparisons between ownership and agency statements and their respective control statements in each condition for both groups.
Active Synchronous Passive Synchronous Active Synchronous Active Asynchronous
Congruent Congruent Incongruent Congruent
FMD group
Ownership statements vs. Ownership controls Z = −3.757; p < 0.001 Z = −3.427; p = 0.001 Z = −2.379; p = 0.017 Z = −0.880; p = 0.379
Agency statements Vs. Agency controls Z = −3.542; p < 0.001 Z = −1.700; p = 0.089 Z = −4.019; p < 0.001 Z = −0.916; p = 0.360
Ownership statements vs. Agency statements Z = −2.534; p = 0.011 Z = −3.082; p = 0.002 Z = −3.827; p < 0.001 Z = −2.508; p = 0.012
HC group
Ownership statements vs. Ownership controls Z = −3.666;p < 0.001 Z = −3.626; p < 0.001 Z = −3.163; p = 0.002 Z = −0.427; p = 0.669
Agency statements vs. Agency controls Z = −3.925; p < 0.001 Z = −0.987; p = 0.324 Z = −3.927; p < 0.001 Z = −1.442; p = 0.149
Ownership statements vs.Agency statements Z = −3.341; p = 0.001 Z = −2.834; p = 0.005 Z = −3.788; p < 0.001 Z = −1.661;p = 0.097
(Figure 2B). These results show that the paradigm was suitable to
successfully elicit both ownership and agency in the two groups.
Additional statistical details are reported in Table 3.
Agency and Ownership within Each
Condition
FMD Group
Wilcoxon signed rank test used to test whether the scores at
the experimental statements were significantly different from
zero, revealed that agency-statements differed from zero in the
Active Synchronous Congruent (p < 0.001) and in the Active
Synchronous Incongruent conditions (p < 0.001). Moreover,
scores at the ownership-statements were significantly different
from zero in the Active Synchronous Congruent (p = 0.004),
Passive Synchronous Congruent (p = 0.001) and Active
Asynchronous Congruent (p = 0.006) conditions. Interestingly,
ownership-statements did not differ from zero in the Active
Synchronous Incongruent condition (p= 0.177), thus suggesting
uncertainty about ownership over the rubber hand.
The comparison between agency- and ownership-statements
within each condition revealed that the agency-statements scores
for the FMD group were higher than the ownership-statements
scores in the Active Synchronous Congruent (p = 0.011), Active
Asynchronous Congruent (p = 0.012), and Active Synchronous
Incongruent conditions (p < 0.001). Conversely, in the Passive
Synchronous Congruent condition, the ownership-statements
scores were higher than the agency-statements scores (p= 0.002)
(Figure 2A).
Healthy Control Group
By comparing the experimental statements against zero, we
found that agency-statements scores significantly differed from
zero in the Active Synchronous Congruent (p < 0.001) and in
the Active Synchronous Incongruent conditions (p < 0.001).
The ownership-statements scores differed from zero in the
Active Synchronous Congruent (p= 0.001), Passive Synchronous
Congruent (p = 0.023), Active Asynchronous Congruent
(p = 0.024) and Active Synchronous Incongruent (p = 0.009)
conditions.
By comparing the ownership- and agency-statements scores,
we found that agency-statements scores were higher than
the ownership-statements scores in the Active Synchronous
Congruent (p = 0.001) and in the Active Synchronous
Incongruent conditions (p < 0.001), but not in the Active
Asynchronous Congruent condition (p = 0.097) (Figure 2B).
Again, in the Passive Synchronous Congruent condition, the
ownership-statements scores were higher than the agency-
statements scores (p = 0.005) (Figure 2B). These results show
a double dissociation between agency and ownership, since in
the Passive Synchronous Congruent condition we could elicit
ownership but not agency; conversely, in the Active Synchronous
Incongruent condition we could elicit agency but not ownership.
See Table 3 for additional statistical details.
Agency and Ownership across
Conditions
FMD Group
The Friedman test to analyze the factor condition separately for
the ownership-statements and the agency-statements, revealed
that in the FMD group the factor condition was significant
for both the ownership- [χ2(3) = 29.09; p < 0.001] and
the agency-statements [χ2(3) = 36.96; p < 0.001]. Post hoc
pairwise comparisons (critical p ≤ 0.016 after Bonferroni
correction) showed that the ownership-statement scores in
both the Active Synchronous Congruent (1.52 ± 0.39) and
the Passive Synchronous Congruent conditions (1.56 ± 0.37)
were higher than in the Active Asynchronous Congruent
(−1.24 ± 0.37) and the Active Synchronous Incongruent
conditions (−0.58 ± 0.42) (all comparisons, p < 0.002)
(Figure 3A). Furthermore, the agency-statement scores were
higher in the Active Synchronous Congruent (2.42 ± 0.24) and
the Active Synchronous Incongruent conditions (2.28 ± 0.19)
than in the Active Asynchronous Congruent (−0.20 ± 0.41) and
the Passive Synchronous Congruent conditions (−0.46 ± 0.41)
(all comparisons, p< 0.001) (Figure 3B).
Healthy Control Group
The factor condition was significant for both the ownership-
[χ2(3) = 32.72; p = 0.000] and the agency-statements
[χ2(3) = 33.46; p < 0.001] also in the control group. As found
for the FMD group, post hoc comparisons (critical p≤ 0.016 after
Bonferroni correction) showed that the ownership-statement
scores were higher in both the Active Synchronous Congruent
(1.40± 0.28) and the Passive Synchronous Congruent conditions
(1.21 ± 0.43) than in the Active Asynchronous Congruent
(−1.11 ± 0.34) and the Active Synchronous Incongruent
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FIGURE 3 | Ownership and agency across conditions in the functional
movement disorders group. (A) Mean scores for the ownership-statements
and (B) the agency-statements across conditions in the functional movement
disorders group. Gray lines and asterisks show significant comparisons
across conditions. The results showed that agency and ownership were
differently elicited by each condition. Error bars indicate standard errors.
conditions (−1.27 ± 0.38) (all comparisons, p < 0.001)
(Figure 4A). Agency-statement scores were higher in the
Active Synchronous Congruent (2.42 ± 0.22) and the Active
Synchronous Incongruent (2.11 ± 0.30) conditions than in
the Active Asynchronous Congruent (−0.49 ± 0.34) and the
Passive Synchronous Congruent conditions (−0.84 ± 0.46) (all
comparisons, p< 0.001) (Figure 4B).
FIGURE 4 | Ownership and agency across conditions in the healthy controls
group. (A) Mean scores for the ownership-statements and (B) the
agency-statements across conditions in the healthy controls group. Gray lines
and asterisks show significant comparisons across conditions. In the
functional movement disorders group, agency and ownership were differently
elicited by each condition. Error bars indicate standard errors.
These results show that agency and ownership were differently
elicited in specific experimental conditions.
See Table 4 for additional statistical details on the post hoc
comparisons.
Agency and Ownership between Groups
The Mann–Whitney U test for comparisons between the two
groups (FMD and HC) revealed similar scores for ownership
in the Active Synchronous Congruent (FMD: 1.52 ± 0.39; HC:
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TABLE 4 | Wilcoxon signed-rank comparisons between conditions for ownership and agency statements in each group.
Passive Synchronous Congruent Active Synchronous Incongruent Active Asynchronous Congruent
FMD group
Ownership-statements
Active Synchronous Congruent Z = −0.314; p = 0.753 Z = −3.139; p = 0.002 Z = −3.705; p < 0.001
Passive Synchronous Congruent − Z = −3.556; p < 0.001 Z = −3.642; p < 0.001
Active Synchronous Incongruent − − Z = −1.410; p = 0.161
Agency-statements
Active Synchronous Congruent Z = −3.729;p < 0.001 Z = −0.509;p = 0.615 Z = −3.810; p < 0.001
Passive Synchronous Congruent − Z = −3.689;p < 0.001 Z = −0.605; p = 0.545
Active Synchronous Incongruent − − Z = −3.422; p = 0.001
HC group
Ownership-statements
Active Synchronous Congruent Z = −0.349;p = 0.727 Z = −3.828; p < 0.001 Z = −3.826; p < 0.001
Passive Synchronous Congruent − Z = −3.642; p < 0.001 Z = −3.282; p = 0.001
Active Synchronous Incongruent − − Z = −0.103; p = 0.918
Agency-statements
Active Synchronous Congruent Z = −3.470; p = 0.001 Z = −1.046; p = 0.294 Z = −3.964; p < 0.001
Passive Synchronous Congruent − Z = −3.388; p = 0.001 Z = −0.676; p = 0.499
Active Synchronous Incongruent − − Z = −3.885; p < 0.001
1.40 ± 0.28; p = 0.423), the Passive Synchronous Congruent
(FMD: 1.56 ± 0.37; HC: 1.21 ± 0.43; p = 0.626), the
Active Synchronous Incongruent (FMD: −0.58 ± 0.42; HC:
−1.27 ± 0.38; p = 0.207), and the Active Asynchronous
Congruent conditions (FMD: −1.24 ± 0.37; HC: −1.11 ± 0.34;
p = 0.939) (Figure 5A). The two groups had also similar scores
with regard to agency in the Active Synchronous Congruent
(FMD: 2.42 ± 0.24; HC: 2.42 ± 0.22; p = 0.697), the
Passive Synchronous Congruent (FMD: −0.46 ± 0.41; HC:
−0.84 ± 0.46; p = 0.362), the Active Synchronous Incongruent
(FMD: 2.28 ± 0.19; HC: 2.11 ± 0.30; p = 0.895), and the
Active Asynchronous Congruent condition (FMD:−0.20± 0.41;
HC: −0.49 ± 0.34; p = 0.696) (Figure 5B and Supplementary
Figure 1). These results indicate that the FMD patients rated
their subjective feeling of agency and ownership similar to the
controls. Moreover, similar results were found for the control
statements as well, which were rated similarly by both groups
(all, p > 0.065), suggesting that, like the HC group, the FMD
patients also experienced other perceptual effects related to the
mRHI paradigm.
Correlation between Disease Duration,
Agency- and Ownership-Statements in
FMD Patients
Ownership-statements did not correlate with disease duration
in any conditions (Active Synchronous Congruent: r = 0.378,
n = 20, p = 0.100; Passive Synchronous Congruent: r = 0.171,
n = 20, p = 0.472; Active Synchronous Incongruent:
r = 0.066, n= 20, p = 0.781; Active Asynchronous Congruent:
r = 0.180, n = 20, p = 0.448). Similarly, we did not found
significant correlations between agency-statements and disease
duration (Active Synchronous Congruent: r = 0.065, n = 20,
p = 0.785; Passive Synchronous Congruent: r = 0.345, n = 20,
p = 0.136; Active Synchronous Incongruent: r = 0.010, n = 20,
p = 0.966; Active Asynchronous Congruent: r = 0.230, n = 20,
p= 0.329).
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the
sense of agency over bodily movements, the sense of body
ownership, and their interaction in FMD patients by means of
the mRHI. The data from the healthy controls confirmed the
reliability of the mRHI paradigm in measuring sense of agency
and sense of body ownership: the agency-statements and the
ownership-statements significantly differed from their respective
control statements in the Active Synchronous Congruent, Active
Synchronous Incongruent, and Passive Synchronous Congruent
conditions. We also found that all participants experienced a
strong sense of agency and illusion of body ownership in the
Active Synchronous Congruent condition, whereas in the Active
Asynchronous Congruent condition, they generally disagreed
with both the agency- and the ownership-statements, indicating
that adding a temporal delay between performed and observed
movement disrupted the sense of both agency and ownership.
Furthermore, a dissociated pattern of results was observed in
the Passive Synchronous Congruent and the Active Synchronous
Incongruent conditions. In the Passive Synchronous Congruent
condition, participants experienced an illusory sense of body
ownership but not agency. Conversely, in the Active Synchronous
Incongruent condition, they perceived a strong sense of agency
but not a sense of body ownership. These results are in line with
previous mRHI studies (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014) and
indicate a double dissociation between ownership and agency,
with the former not necessarily implying the latter and vice
versa.
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FIGURE 5 | Ownership and agency for all the conditions in the functional
movement disorders and the healthy controls groups. Mean scores for the
(A) ownership-statements and (B) the agency-statements in the functional
movement disorders group (FMD; black columns) and the healthy controls
group (HC; gray columns). The two groups showed similar patterns of
response. Error bars represent standard errors.
The most interesting finding was the lack of differences
between the two groups with regard to sense of agency.
This finding was unexpected, especially in the experimental
conditions involving active movements. Previous studies
demonstrated that execution of active movements requires
matching processes of predicted and actual sensory feedback
(Blakemore et al., 1998; Frith et al., 2000; van den Bos and
Jeannerod, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008; Chambon et al., 2014), which
are known to be altered in FMD patients (Voon et al., 2010, 2011;
Edwards et al., 2013; Maurer et al., 2016).
In our paradigm, we expected a reduced sense of agency in the
FMD patients specifically in the Active Synchronous Congruent
and in the Active Synchronous Incongruent conditions in which
these processes should occur.
The lack of difference between the two groups could be
explained by the nature of the paradigm applied. In the mRHI
used here, the sense of agency was evaluated with an explicit
measure, whereas previous studies used implicit paradigms
(Edwards et al., 2011; Kranick et al., 2013; Pareés et al., 2014;
Macerollo et al., 2015). As a general consideration, the use of
implicit paradigms offers several advantages, for instance, the
possibility to target and measure specific correlates of voluntary
action (e.g., sensory attenuation) without requiring participants
to explicitly focus on agency (Wolpe and Rowe, 2014; Haggard,
2017). This allows to potentially exclude confounding factors,
such as cognitive biases (e.g., tendency to overestimate one’s
own agency) or contextual cues, which could influence explicit
judgment of agency (Haggard, 2017). On the other hand, implicit
measures do not allow to assess the subjective experience of
control which is, instead, captured by explicit measures (Moore
et al., 2012; Dewey and Knoblich, 2014). With regard to the
clinical population in our study (i.e., FMD patients), explicit
measures allow to capture what happens in clinical practice, when
FMD patients explicitly report a lack of control over their motor
symptoms. Moreover, by using explicit measures we were able to
specifically assess an aspect of the sense of agency which implicit
measures, by nature, are unable to detect (e.g., the subjective
experience of control over bodily movements). Nonetheless, one
could argue that since our findings are based on explicit measures,
they could have been biased by the participants’ compliance
and suggestibility. However, the difference in scores between
the ownership- and agency-statements and their respective
control statements suggests that the participants answered
truthfully and not because of mere compliance or suggestibility.
Explicit and implicit measures of agency have been found to
dissociate and imply different underlying mechanisms (Dewey
and Carr, 2013). More precisely, the implicit measures of agency
(e.g., sensory attenuation and intentional binding) are thought
to capture the so-called “feeling of agency” (i.e., non-conceptual
feeling of being the agent of a certain action) that relies on
low-level sensorimotor processes involving efferent motor cues
and sensory feedback (Synofzik et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012).
However, the sense of agency does not involve only a non-
conceptual level (i.e., “feeling of agency”), but also a conceptual
level, that is the “judgment of agency” (Synofzik et al., 2008;
Moore et al., 2012). The explicit measures of agency reflect this
“judgment of agency” (i.e., the explicit attribution of agency)
that involves higher-order sources of information like beliefs
and contextual cues (Synofzik et al., 2008; Desantis et al., 2011,
2012; Moore et al., 2012). Explicit and implicit aspects of agency
also differ with regards to the brain areas that they involve.
More precisely, while the pre-supplementary motor area within
a frontal-striatal circuit is involved in implicit aspects of agency
(Wolpe et al., 2016), the insula and parietal lobe are involved in
the explicit aspects of agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al.,
2003).
Hence, implicit and explicit measures of agency allow to
capture different aspects.
Our findings suggest that the explicit component of sense
of agency is preserved. Why this is so is still unclear. One
hypothesis is related to the potential role of other cognitive
factors, like prior beliefs, in differentially influencing the explicit
sense of agency for normal voluntary movements and for motor
symptoms. In this regard, it was suggested that a patient’s feeling
of control over motor symptoms is undermined by the belief
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that the symptom has an organic basis (Kranick and Hallett,
2013). We speculate that this prior belief could affect the explicit
judgment of agency for motor symptoms, but not for normal
voluntary movements like those required in our task (e.g., finger
tapping).
Our findings also contrast with previous studies that targeted
other clinical populations (e.g., schizophrenia), which present
with abnormalities in the sense of agency (Franck et al., 2001;
Thakkar et al., 2011). For instance, Franck et al. (2001) found that
schizophrenic patients made more self-attribution errors than
healthy controls on an action recognition task, demonstrating
that schizophrenic patients have difficulty in distinguishing their
own action from others’ actions. Such is not the case in FMD
patients. Indeed, as demonstrated for the first time by our study,
patients with FMD are able to distinguish a self-generated bodily
action (i.e., Active Synchronous Congruent condition, Active
Synchronous Incongruent condition) from an externally induced
action (i.e., Passive Synchronous Congruent condition).
We also found that the two groups were comparable for
the sense of body ownership, suggesting that this cognitive
function is preserved in FMD patients. This observation is shared
by another recent study that used the classical RHI paradigm
(Demartini et al., 2016). In the RHI paradigm, the illusory
sense of body ownership over the artificial hand is induced
by stroking a static visible rubber hand and the participant’s
hidden hand simultaneously (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). In this
context, the multisensory integration of visual, proprioceptive,
and tactile information grounds the illusion. Demartini et al.
(2016) found a similar amount of illusion in FMD patients and
healthy controls, suggesting that the sense of body ownership is
efficient in FMD. With our mRHI study, we add new insight along
this line by demonstrating that the sense of body ownership is
preserved in FMD even when visual and proprioceptive sensory
information interact with the motor system (rather than with
tactile information).
Moreover, previous studies used the RHI to investigate
interaction between the motor system and the sense of body
ownership in other movement disorders (e.g., hemiplegia)
(Lenggenhager et al., 2012; Scandola et al., 2014; Tidoni
et al., 2014; Burin et al., 2015). Interestingly, these studies
demonstrated that despite abnormalities in the motor system,
patients subjectively experienced a strong illusion (Lenggenhager
et al., 2012; Scandola et al., 2014; Tidoni et al., 2014; Burin et al.,
2015). Caution is warranted when comparing our study with
previous works targeting movement disorders due to an organic
disease (e.g., hemiplegia). Our findings of preserved illusory body
ownership in FMD add further insights into the relationship
between the presence of motor symptoms and the sense of body
ownership. Namely, in line with a previous study (Demartini
et al., 2016) no alteration of this cognitive function has been
found in FMD.
Although the main analyses did not show significant
differences in agency-statements and ownership-statements
between the FMD and HC groups, additional analysis revealed a
different pattern of responses between the two groups with regard
to one specific condition: the Active Synchronous Incongruent.
Of note, in this condition, the rubber hand is placed in an
anatomically implausible posture (180◦ rotated with respect
to the participant’s body), thus usually preventing the illusory
embodiment of the rubber hand. In this condition, however,
participants can actively move the rubber hand, thus favoring a
sense of agency over the observed hand. As expected, the scores
for the HC group on the ownership-statements were different
from 0 in a negative direction, suggesting that they denied a sense
of body ownership over the rubber hand. Conversely, the FMD
group scores were not different from 0, revealing uncertainty
about ownership over the rubber hand. This pattern of results
may suggest that in FMD patients the execution of an active
movement makes the processing of an incompatible rubber hand
less clear-cut, thus creating uncertainty about a possible illusory
sense of ownership. A possible interpretation of this finding
could be related to decision-making processes. More precisely,
a previous study using an abstract probabilistic reasoning task
showed that FMD patients make decisions on the basis of
less evidence compared to healthy controls (Pareés et al., 2012).
It was suggested that this style of reasoning, called “jumping
to conclusion” bias, derives from the overestimation of the
sensory data, which causes an inappropriate updating of internal
models (Pareés et al., 2012). In the context of our study, we
speculate that in the Active Synchronous Incongruent condition,
the sensory information coming from the moving body part,
together with the similarities between the rubber hand and the
own hand (e.g., similar shape), were taken as sufficient evidence
to jump to the conclusion that the rubber hand could potentially
be the own hand. Why this is the case only in the Active
Synchronous Incongruent condition is not clear and deserves
further investigation.
This study has several limitations. First, since we used
explicit (i.e., questionnaire) rather than implicit measures (e.g.,
proprioceptive drift, sensory attenuation, intentional biding) of
agency and ownership, we cannot directly compare explicit
and implicit RHI effects in our sample, which limits the
generalizability of our results. Future mRHI studies in FMD
using also implicit measures of both functions would add further
information about the mechanisms underlying self-attribution
of bodily action in FMD. Second, the heterogeneous sample of
patients (10 with functional tremor alone or associated with
other functional symptoms, 11 with gait disorders) limits detailed
evaluation of potential differences in sense of agency in relation
to the type and localization of functional motor symptoms,
especially in our study where we tested the sense of agency
for upper limb movements. It should be noted, however, that
our sample was similar to those of previous studies in which
alterations in the implicit sense of agency were found (Kranick
et al., 2013). Third, the participants rated their subjective feelings
on a 7-point Likert scale. Although, the scale was able to
detect differences between groups (e.g., schizophrenic patients vs.
healthy controls) in a previous RHI study (Thakkar et al., 2011),
it could be argued that the scale was not sensitive enough to
capture potential alterations in the FMD patients in the present
study. Fourth, our task was developed from previous studies in
which one trial per condition was tested. Since the patient sample
was characterized by between- as well as within-subject variability
in performance, having more than one trial per condition could
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have helped to reduce variability and obtain more consistent
results. By the same token, adding more repetitions of the same
trial would have increased the duration of the overall experiment,
with the potential risk of attenuating the patients’ compliance to
continue with the session due to mental fatigue and diminished
attentional resources. Fifth, there were only two men in our
sample of 21 patients, and this may limit the generalizability of
our findings to male FMD patients. This feature (i.e., unbalanced
gender distribution) is shared with the majority of previous
studies (e.g., Edwards et al., 2013; Pareés et al., 2014; Macerollo
et al., 2015), and might reflect the observation that FMDs are
significantly more common among women than men (Peckham
and Hallet, 2009). Sixth, the lack of significant difference between
patients and controls in our study was derived by applying
a conventional statistical approach for data analysis. Previous
studies in which a similar paradigm was applied (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2012, 2014; Louzolo et al., 2015) used the same statistical
approach. Hence, we thought that it was suitable also to our
explorative study, as it gave us the possibility to interpret our
findings based on the previous literature. We acknowledge,
however, that this does not allow to state that the null hypothesis
is true and therefore that the two groups are the same. Other
statistical approaches, like the Bayes factor analysis, could help in
the future to disambiguate how much likely the null hypothesis is
with respect to the hypothesis that the groups differ.
These limitations notwithstanding, this is the first empirical
study to suggest that the subjective experience of agency for
normal voluntary movements is preserved in FMD, as assessed
by the moving Rubber Hand Illusion paradigm. Together
with previous work, our study depicts the sense of agency as
a complex cognitive function in which implicit and explicit
aspects can differentially influence the subjective experience of
motor control in FMD patients. Two forms of dissociation
may be distinguished: a dissociation between the implicit and
the explicit sense of agency for normal voluntary movements
in FMD and a dissociation between the explicit sense of
agency for normal voluntary movements and for functional
motor symptoms. Further studies are needed to elucidate the
interactions between the implicit and the explicit components of
the sense of agency in FMD and also to reveal the mechanisms
underlying a possible dissociation in the explicit sense of agency
between normal voluntary movement and functional motor
symptoms.
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